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3.1 Historical backgroundThe period between the two wars was marked by several events. First, the French and English populations were sickened by the First World War ("never again"). This pacifist feeling led to the creation of the League of Nations to prevent a new war. This was followed by the Great Depression of 1929, which was particularly disastrous for the German population and which largely explains how the Nazis came to power. Pacifism combined with the collapse of the economy then froze the investments of the French Army for a long time. However, from 1936 onwards, another war appeared increasingly inevitable and, as a result, France and England finally rearmed themselves. 3.2 Encryption in France – Beginning the history of the C-36The cryptography techniques used during and after the First World War were primarily based on two-part codes (a part to encrypt and another one to decrypt) with superencipherment. These methods, although offering a good level of security, were slow and prone to error. For many experts, including Marcel Givierge [1], the solution was to focus on the emerging cipher machines. Thanks to them, the encryption time was shortened and the encryption errors were greatly reduced. If, moreover, the machines respect Kerchoffs’ principle, they ensure complete security even if they fall into the hands of the enemy. Consequently, from 1923, Givierge did everything possible to ensure that the French Army was equipped with cipher machines. Thus, in 1925, the Bureau du Chiffre, which he directed, carried out tests on a machine manufactured by the Carpentier company (cf. 3.3). It is interesting to view the beginning of the document that describes these tests because it demonstrates the efforts of the Bureau du Chiffre to equip the army with cipher machines (SHD-7N4235 1940):
Ministry of War - Army Staff – Bureau du Chiffre - Secret - Paris,
December 13, 1925. Note for the 3e EMA Office [2] and the communications
service, under cover of the 4e direction.
The Bureau du Chiffre has been studying cipher machines for more than
two years. Following the examination of foreign device patents, the
Bureau had drawn up a project which, in February 1923, gave rise, with
a view to its realization, to a whole correspondence with the possible
constructor establishments, of which a letter to the director of the
signal section. The Bureau du Chiffre had in mind an extremely portable
device, intended for encryption in small units. A test model was built
at Puteaux, but following procedures which, instead of seeking to
resolve the part of the problem that had been identified in the Bureau
du Chiffre, namely the printing of characters by a robust and light
device, solved the problem by adopting a heavy typewriter requiring
considerable electric force. Faced with this result, quite different
from its wishes, and the expenses incurred, the Bureau du Chiffre then
contented itself with ensuring that its key process, consisting of a cut
strip, produced a satisfactory result, and it handed over, at a more
favorable time from a financial point of view, the continuation of the
project realization...
The Head of the Bureau du Chiffre: Givierge.
Germany was the first to realize that the future of encryption hinged on the
use of a cipher machine and enlisted Enigma up to battalion level.
The French staff were jealous and sought to equip themselves with an equivalent
machine (SHD-7N3988 1938):
Ministry of War, Engineering, Directorate of Military Telegraphy
Equipment, to the Minister of War. Paris on March 1, 1934. Report
by Colonel Julien.
... especially in the German Army, the use of cryptographic machines
has been pushed up to battalion level [3]. … In summary, the Colonel
Director of Military Telegraphy Equipment has the honor of presenting
the following proposals:
1) Adopt the cryptographic machine studied by the Bureau du Chiffre[4].
Determine the endowments to be foreseen for the EM [5] and the signal
services of the large units ...
2) Examine the advisability of providing the units within the division
with simple and space-saving cipher machines and, if so, prescribe the
study by the Bureau du Chiffre of a type of machine that meets these
conditions.
In the end, the French government buys B-211 machines from the company
Ingeniörsfirman Teknik headed by Boris Hagelin. But these machines are
heavy (16 kg), expensive (18,000 Fr, approximately $15,000 today), and
poorly suited to moving units. They will therefore be reserved for the
military staffs only.
The staff then asks Mr. Hagelin for the impossible: a robust machine that prints the cryptogram or the plain text. The machine is intended to equip small units such as divisions and battalions. Ultimately, the machine must be extremely small: It must be able to be carried in the pocket of a soldier's coat. Mr. Hagelin himself tells the story of the machine he then created (Hagelin and Kahn 1994): Mr. Hagelin cut a block of wood to estimate the dimensions of the machine to ensure that it would fit in a soldier's pocket. He created a first prototype, taking inspiration from a coin changing machine he had previously created. This changer consisted of a drum with bars around its circumference. Keys spun the drum. The bars could move to the left when the drum was rotated. The bars, in turn, caused a typewheel to turn with as many steps as the bars moved. Mr. Hagelin replaced the keys with the pin wheels from the B-21/B-211. The typewheel printed letters instead of numbers. The C-35 was born. Then, Mr. Hagelin made some modifications. The machine was fixed on a tray and a protective cover was added. The underside of the table was rounded so that the machine could be fixed on the operator's knee. This machine was named the C-36. The letter C designated the technology used (drum and pin wheels) and the number indicated the model year (35 = 1935, 36 = 1936). In 1935, Hagelin supplied the French Army with some C-35 machines. They were tested during maneuvers and the staff was delighted (SHD-7N4235 1940). These machines finally solved the army's encryption problems. In 1936, after new maneuvers confirmed the importance of mechanical encryption for small units, the head of the Bureau du Chiffre proposed the purchase of 3,000 small machines, which corresponds to 30 machines per division, assuming that France could align 100 divisions in the event of war (SHD-7N4235 1940)[6]:
Army Staff – Bureau du Chiffre - Subject: Cryptographic machines.
SECRET - January 17, 1936. Note for the General-in-Chief of the
General Staff of the Army.
- I - Mechanical encryption in small units
... Mechanical encryption ... automatically provides secure, fast,
and flexible encryption. Commissioned up to battalion level for
exercises in motorized divisions (September 3 to 8, 1935) as well
as for combat exercises at Mailly camp (September 20 to 25, 1935).
Cryptographic machines have given complete satisfaction. They were
extremely favorably received in the subordinate units whose non-
specialized personnel succeeded in encrypting telegrams correctly
and quickly, reaching a rate of 70 letters per minute.
- II - Needs
A / Portable machine needs
... As an example, the distribution would be as follows for a
normal type infantry division:
Status of the DI: 2 machines; Staff of the ID: 1 machine; AD
Staff: 1 machine; 1 ° Infantry Regiment: 4 machines; 2 ° "":
4 machines; 3 ° "": 4 machines; Field Artillery Regiment:
4 machines; Heavy Artillery Regiment: 3 machines; GRD [7]: 1 machine;
Engineer Battalion: 1 machine; Balloonists company: 1 machine;
Reserve: 4 machines. Total: 30 machines
For a Cavalry division, there would be a slightly higher endowment
of 30 machines with 5 in reserve, i.e.,: 35 machines.
B / Requirements for large model machines ...
C / Requirements for maintenance and troubleshooting
... In summary, the military currently needs 51 large machines
and 3,000 portable machines …
- III - EMERGENCY ORDER
... Appropriations to be entered in the 1937 budget ... It would
be appropriate to enter in the 1937 budget
a) 918,000 francs corresponding to the purchase of 51 large machines.
b) 3,000,000 francs corresponding to the purchase of 1,000 small
machines. The same sum being planned for each of the years 1938 and
1939. The completion of the purchase of 3,000 small machines would
thus be completed at the end of 1939 ....
Lt-Colonel De France de Tersant, Head of the Bureau du Chiffre of
the Army Staff.
The only problem (and of size), the budget. The requirements for small
machines were in fact estimated at 30 machines per division, or
approximately 3,000 machines for the 100 divisions that could be
activated in the event of a conflict. In 1937, the French state
decided to order 1,000 machines at a price of 3,000 fr. per unit
(around $2,500 today)[8]. The order was financed in the 1938 budget
and was therefore effective the following year (1939). Perhaps
there were other commands, but there is no record of them in the
SHD archives. In May 1940, deliveries were still continuing.
Undoubtedly, not all of the orders could be fulfilled following
the signing of the armistice on June 22, 1940.
Here is a document that justifies the order for 1,000 small
machines (SHD-7N3988 1938):
The Cpt RONON of the EMA (3rd office) to the General Cdt of the
troops and communication services. - February 16, 1937 ...
In 1938, it was decided to order 1,000 small model ciphering
machines similar to those that were tested in the maneuvers of 1936.
The advantages of this device are multiple, in particular, it allows
- the maintenance of almost absolute secrecy even if a machine
falls into the hands of the enemy.
- the authorities who exchange messages to be assured of the
faithful transcription of their text. The use of codes encourages,
on the contrary, to distortions of expressions which affect the
accuracy of the information..
- the number of people assigned to encryption to be reduced to
a minimum (only one operator per machine).
- messages to be exchanged between any authorities. Operators have
no special training and no knowledge of any general or specific
code. …
Mr. Hagelin (Hagelin and Kahn 1994) claims to have had 5,000 machines
ordered. Nevertheless, he specifies that all the machines were not
delivered. According to the documents inspected at the SHD, at least
1,000 machines were ordered and 3,000 at most.
Footnotes:
3.3 Has the C-36 been tested?The adoption by the army of a cipher machine is fraught with consequences both in terms of budget and transmission security. Consequently, it makes sense for the military to test the machine’s security before making their final decision. We know that in the US, Mr. Friedman tested several machines, notably Mr. Hebern's machine. This machine was then almost accepted by the U.S. Navy in 1924. However, following Mr. Friedman's codebreaking, the purchase of this machine was abandoned. No evidence that such a test was carried out for the C-36 was found at SHD, but it is likely that it did take place. Indeed, such a test was carried out in December 1925 to prove the security of a cipher machine (which made teletype) created by Mr. Carpentier. Commander Bassières succeeded in deciphering the test messages. The project was consequently abandoned (SHD-7N4235 1940, cf. 3.2). At the time, it was Colonel Givierge who headed the Bureau du Chiffre. 3.4 German cryptanalysisKnowledge of the functioning of a cipher machine is a prerequisite for its cryptanalysis. As we will see in the following chapters, the breaking of the C-36 and B-211 codes by the Germans was late. We can therefore deduce the failure of German espionage before the war to unravel the main means of French encryption. Thus, the operations of the B-211 and the C-36 were completely unknown to the Germans before the war. Conversely, French espionage made it possible to know the Enigma in detail (with the exception of the wiring of its rotors). This knowledge at first only allowed the Poles (who discovered the wiring of the rotors), then later all the Allies, to decipher a significant part of its traffic from the start of the war. References
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